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Juvenal Habyarimana : A President who died in sadnessOlivier Nyirubugara TABLE OF CONTENTS
It has now become an established principle that leaders formerly cited as example by foreign lesson givers will die like an insect, and that no body will ask about their death. The former presidents of Rwanda and Zaire (now DRC) Juvenal Habyarimana and Mobutu Sesse Seko are good illustrative examples of African leaders who once enjoyed the West’s sympathies before losing them entirely and becoming unwanted. Habyarimana seized power after a coup d’ Etat in July 1973 and spent quite glorious years and managed to conquer the favours of French presidents – Valéry Giscard d’Estaing et François Mitterrand – as well as those of the former coloniser –Belgium – who had rather excellent relationships with the Republic of Rwanda, the one they helped install in 1961. This article will not cover those good old days of president Habyarimana, but rather those dark ones which he experienced during his last months as depicted by various authors who knew him or have interest in his death. We will mainly rely on the books by Jacques Roger Booh Booh (Le patron de Dallaire PARLE, 2005), general Romeo Dallaire (J’ai serré la main du diable, 2003), Filip Reyntjens (Rwanda : trois jours qui ont fait basculer l’histoire, 1995) and the writings and testimonies compiled in Silence sur un attentat, 2003, édited by Charles Onana, a journalist from Cameroon. A President under Pressure
In the beginning of 1994, President Habyarimana started being harassed and pressurised by the entire international community. Belgium, the Unites States, the UN, the World Bank, to mention a few, never accorded Habyarimana a minute to breath. General Dallaire, who was commanding the forces of the UN Peace keeping mission known as UNAMIR, and who was in a good position to observe Habyarimana, sheds light on the pressure which was growing heavier on Habyarimina’s shoulders:
On the UN side, the Secretary General Boutros Boutros Ghali did not hesitate to use a non-conventional diplomatic language while addressing himself to President Habyarimana, as if the latter had become an ordinary citizen of Rwanda. That kind of language shows that Habyarimana was no longer wanted and that he ought by any means to be put offside. The report on the 1 March 1994 meeting between Habyarimna’ s special envoy, minister Andre Ntagerura and Boutros Boutros Ghali is highly illustrative. Here are some excerpts that Booh Booh gathered in his book and which reflect the perception of Habyarimana at the UN:
On top of the UN pressure came that of the World Bank, the most important financial partner of Rwanda. According to Dallaire (p. 232), that institution “ was threatening to stop its funds to Rwanda if the TBBG [Transitional Broad-Based Government ] was not in place by the 1st of March” . Dallaire notes that such a decision would have disastrous consequences as other countries and organizations would take the same move. The former colonial power – the one that installed the Hutu on power in 1961 before offering them independence one year later after humiliating the Tutsi elite – did not dissociate itself from the rest of the international community. It rather used all its weight to force its former protégé to bow down. Reyntjens describes the Belgians’ pressure as following:
Likewise, the greatest world power, the United States, joined the party. They sent, among others the State Department's deputy assistant secretary for African affairs, Prudence Bushnell, who arrived in Kigali on 25 March 1994, one day before the publication of the list [contested by Habyarimana] of the MP candidates by Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana. According to Dallaire, “ she also met with Booh Booh and told him that it would be difficult to renew UMANIR’s mandate during the next meeting of the Security Council if the installation of the TBBG showed no progress and if scenes of violence kept taking place” (Dallaire, p. 275, Translation: Olivier Nyirubugara). Reyntjens adds that Bushnell insisted in the same direction as Mr. Claes – that it was five to twelve ( Reyntjens, p. 18) This is the Habyarimana without any external support and upset who received Booh Booh in his residence in Gasiza, near Gisenyi, to complain about that situation:
It is in that state of mind that Habyarimana flew to Gbadolite to seek advice from his long-time friend and ally President Mobutu, with regards to his fears and sad times he was experiencing. Reyntjens perceives the two Habyarimana’s visits to Gbadolite in such short a period – 26 February and 4 April 1994 – as an attempt to seek sub-regional support as he could not expect any from the most influent members of the International Community (Reyntjens, p. 18). In his testimony, Honore Ngbanda, a witness of the last meeting between Mobutu and Habyarimana, describes an unrecognizable and powerless Habyarimana, who was seeing his situation worsening and the death getting nearer and nearer. With regard to the pressure which was traumatizing Habyarimana, Ngbanda writes:
Habyarimana, who was previously powerful and an absolute strongman of Rwanda, finally found himself pushed into a dead corner by the International Community, which was giving him no other choice but giving up every thing to the internal and armed oppositions, thereby putting himself offside. This pressure was accompanied by another phenomenon, the one of having Habyarimana ignored, isolated and even insulted inside the country. An Ignored President.Between 1973 – when Habyarimana seized power – and 1990 – the year in which the RPF attacked Rwanda – Habyarimana was feared and respected. Before any news bulletin, Radio Rwanda w ould first air an excerpt from one of the President’s speeches announcing the strategies of his State-party, the MRND [amatwara ya Muvoma]. All the day long, the same state-controlled radio station would have programmes aimed at praising him; each citizen had to wear a medal with his portrait beside a big portrait in the middle of the living room. During the electoral period, the Radio Rwanda would regularly play a popular song, among others, which would normally scandalize believers. Some of its verses went as follows:
We gave this background on purpose to allow an easier understanding of the comparison between “ Habyarimana the Glorious” and “ Habyarimana the Unhappy”.
Encouraged by the idea that the International Community was fed up with Habyarimana who, they say, “was simply trying to stick to some vestiges of power to avoid prison or worse” (Dallaire, p. 268, translation: Olivier Nyirubugara), the internal opposition started humiliating him. On 22 February 1994, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, who was known for her abuse of language towards the President (Dallaire, p.255), abused the latter. A few weeks before that meeting, precisely on 8 January, Habyarimana had been publicly humiliated by the very Prime Minister, this time in front of all political parties, including the RPF, and in front of the delegates of the International Community. Here is the story of Booh Booh who attended the meeting at Village Urugwiro:
The affront that Habyarimana suffered that day is ravaging. In fact, by accepting to be sworn in on 5 January 1994 within the framework of the Arusha Accord, Habyarimana had renounced many of his prerogatives and powers – namely the appointment and dismissal of the Prime Minister – and the function of President of the Republic had become “ honorific” (Booh Booh, p. 75). That explains why they could easily ignore and even insult him. Let us have a short stop at this insult to understand in which state of mind Habyarimana might have been. The Prime Minister is referring to the Rwandese culture, which actually has some philosophy of lie summarized by terms like Ubwenge – meaning not only “intelligence” but also “ smartness” – and Amayeri¬¬ - a term we also find in Lingala (Mayele) and which means “smartness” as well. These two terms do not exclude [slight] lies. This same culture formally forbids that a woman insult a man, in private or in public. The offence becomes worse when the man is older than the woman. A woman daring to violate that cultural law is called umushizi w’isoni, which means “ the one who violates cultural rules governing female reserve”. Knowing that Habyarimana was at least ten years older than his Prime Minister, we can guess how devastating the psychological chock was for him, who probably had to suffer similar affronts at every cabinet meeting. Whereas Habyarimana had lost his power and powerfulness, his former classmate at the Kabgayi Junior Seminary Joseph Kavaruganda, chairman of the Highest Court of Appeal (Cour de Cassation) and ipso facto chairman of the Constitutional Court, was becoming an indispensable figure in the installation of transitional institutions. The President took his oath in front of him, and without him or his approval, the institutions could not be put in place. The reasons for ending his friendship with Habyarimana remain unknown. We should simply say that Kavaruganda contributed to the isolation of Habyarimana and that, at a certain moment, he envisaged to install the new institutions without taking into account Habyarimana. Before engaging in that adventure, Kavaruganda had the wisdom to “secretly” associate the UN through its representative Booh Booh to his project. Booh Booh summarizes Kavaruganda’s plan:
At this stage, we see a completely isolated Habyarimana: the executive branch headed by Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the judiciary represented by Justice Joseph Kavaruganda have allied themselves against him. We should mention that at that time, the legislative had ceased to exist pending the installation of the transitional National Assembly, and that the function of President of the Republic had become symbolic. Under these conditions, his single political survival resided in a TBBG and a National Assembly favourable to him, and that is where the whole equation behind the February-March 1994 political deadlock were. Booh Booh depicts the political situation of that period as follows:
Let us seize this occasion to regret the lack of information on the part of former aides of Habyarimana. Some of the details at their disposal could have allowed us to complete this work. There is no doubt that Habyarimana still enjoyed considerable support within the MRND, the army and among the population, especially in the north of Rwanda. It is with much appetite that we devoured the book by Edouard Karemera (Le drame rwandais :les aveux accablants des chefs de la Mission des Nations Unies pour l’Assistance au Rwanda ,Lille: Editions Source du Nil, 2006) seeking clews about the last days of president Habyarimana, at least among his own supporters. Unfortunately, that former minister and vice-president of the MRND party contented himself with taking note of and commenting the “heartbreaking consents of the heads of the UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda”, namely Booh Booh and Dallaire. Despite that, we salute his appeal to former political leaders under Habyarimana to take their pens and write to avoid one-way ideas and the distortion of the history of which they were witnesses (Karemera,p.21). From the foregoing, we conclude that any political man in the situation of Habyarimana as depicted above, would expect anything, since all the doors and ears would be closed to him. All that has been mentioned were just precursor signs that Habyarimana managed to detect as the coming shows. A President who saw Death Come
In any war situation, it is not surprising that a army commander, not to mention a supreme commander of the armed forces, fear for his life, as he is aware of the military principle that by decapitating the enemy, you vanquish him easily. Thus, Habyarimana was the first military target for the RPF and the first political target for the opposition parties allied to the RPF. In an interview granted to BBC’s Stephen Sackur on 7 December 2006, President Paul Kagame, who was reacting to the allegations of French anti-terror judge Jean-Louis Bruguiere pointing at him as responsible for Habyarimana’s death, evoked this principle. After repeating his questions three times - But do you believe you had a right to assassinate him?- and interrupting him many times, Sackur finally got the following answer from the Rwandan President:
Habyarimana was a “wanted” military and political leader who was aware of the growing pressure on his shoulders. He had certainly been informed by the French regarding the sol-air missiles that the RPF was hiding in the National Assembly building. Colonel Luc Marshall, UNAMIR deputy commander testified that late in February 1994 the French Embassy Defence Attaché, Colonel Cussac, came to him to ask if the UNAMIR was “sure that the RPF was not hiding Sol-Air missiles at the National Assembly building?” (Marchal, in Silence sur un attentat, pp. 29-30). The French having maintained their friendship with Habyarimana, or at least having shown no sign of hostility toward him, we can assume that they shared their intelligence about the missiles with Habyarimana, which certainly confirmed his fears. This is perhaps the source Honore Ngbanda is referring to when he writes about Habyarimana that he “ had ‘intelligence from credible sources’ that made no doubt at all in his mind as to the imminence of the danger awaiting him” ( Ngbanda, in Silence sur un attentat, pp.17-22). In April 1994, Ngbanda was Special Advisor to President Mobutu. He claims having attended the last meeting between the two presidents on 4 April 1994 in Gbadolite. According to his testimony (Ngbanda, idem supra), Habyarimana was “ exceeded”, “ scandalized”, “ revolted” and “ furious” against the Belgians and the Americans whom he considered to be the mastermind of the “ imminent project of his assassination”. He was asking Mobutu’s help because, based on the documents he had, he “ was convinced that certain western powers had decided to eliminated him physically”. During that « tense » and « exceptionally long, very long » meeting, Habyarimana acknowledged that what was pressure a few weeks before had become “ more and more pressing and unambiguous threats” and that Belgium and the United States were using hard word while talking to him (Ngbanda, idem supra). According to Lieutenant Abdul Ruzibiza, a former RPF intelligence officer claiming to have been member of the ‘ Network Commando’ assigned to assassinate Habyarimana, Habyarimana’s fears nearly transformed themselves into reality on his way back from Gbadolite on 5 January 1994. Ruzibiza writes that on that day, “ he was nearly shot down while flying back from Zaire but it was not possible to install the missile in the shooting position during the day” ( Ruzibiza, p. 237). Two days before that visit to Gbadolite, general Dallaire had met with then RPF commander general Kagame in Mulindi. We prefer to let the reader go through this Dallaire’s quote himself and draw the conclusion as to the possible links among the different statements made so far:
The two major generals – Habyarimana and Kagame – as depicted by two foreign observers – Ngbanda and Dallaire – who had had a chance to see them in a different mood, have many things in common: both of them appear in a different mood than usual; they are tense; they give a bizarre impression; and above all, they announce something horrible: “ imminent assassination” for Habyarimana ( Ngbanda, idem supra) and an imminent “cataclysm” that no body would be able to control for Kagame (Dallaire , idem supra). Two days after his meeting with Kagame, that is the day of Habyarimana’s last visit to Gbadolite, Dallaire and Colonel Theoneste Bagosora (Director of Cabinet of the Ministry of Defense) were attending a party offered by the UNAMIR Senegalese contingent to celebrate their country’s independence. On that occasion, Dallaire went to Bagosora “ who was drunk and who was more talkative than usual” (Dallaire, p. 285) and asked him “ if President Habyarimana had designated his successor” (Dallaire, p. 285). Dallaire adds that it was just a matter of curiosity “ to know the successor, in case something would happen to Habyarimana” (Dallaire, p. 285). He acknowledges at the same time that that question was like “ a bomb exploding in the ears of Bagosora ” (Dallaire, p. 285) who answered that he had no idea about Habyarimana’s successor. To the two above-mentioned major-generals in an unusual mood and tense, we should add a third general with an unusual and suspicious curiosity. Conclusion: plot or mere accident?
Whereas it is clear that Habyarimana saw his death coming and that he could not have avoided it, confusion persists about the plot theory. Writing about the so-called Dar es-Salaam peace summit on 6 April 1994, American journalist Wayne Madsen reveals that there have been numerous last-minute cancellations among the invitees, among whom Mobutu and Kenyan President Arap Moi (Madsen, in Silence sur un attentat, pp.64-65). He also notes that the Chief of Staff of the Burundian army Colonel Jean Bikomagu, a Tutsi, who was scheduled to accompany his President, was warned while getting ready to board the plane to Dar es-Salaam. Booh Booh himself, whose key mission was to favour any effort aimed to bring peace “declined the invitation which announced no agenda” and which appeared “hurriedly prepared and improvised” (Booh Booh, p. 143), and preferred to maintain his business-as-usual agenda consisting in preparing his 7 April trip to the drought victims in Kibuye. Quoting a testimony of former French Cooperation Minister, Bernard Debre, Madsen suggests that Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni played a decisive role in the plot. In fact, Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira came to Kigali because President Museveni “had persuaded the two presidents to fly to Kampala the day after to further work on the peace process”. After Ntaryamira had sent his plane to Bujumbura, “ Museveni retained Ntaryamira for a meeting” forcing the two presidents to fly later than planned, thereby making the task much easier for those who had ambushed them at the Kigali Airport. (Madsen, in Silence sur un attentat, pp.65-66). Whatever happened, the only thing that is almost absolutely certain is that Habyarimana underwent a serious psychological suffering when he found himself powerless in front of those who were insulting him, and when he saw death coming without having any means to escape. He certainly died with a tightened heart, in sadness! Bibliography :- BBC, BBC's Stephen Sackur talks to Rwanda's president, Paul
Kagame, 7 December 2006.
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